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Ateenage girl died earlier this year atDuke University Medical Centerafter a heart-lung transplant when
the donor turned out to be ABO
incompatible.1 The circumstances were
particularly tragic and poignant; the
funds for her procedure had been raised
by concerned citizens in support of her
desperate parents who had taken quite
extraordinary steps to save the life of
their daughter. The surgeon who re-
quested and accepted the organs as-
sumed that ABO compatibility had been
established. The error was detected only
after the procedure had been completed.
In spite of every effort, life support had to
be withdrawn some 2 weeks later when
brain death became evident after a
second transplant. The response of the
hospital and its staff appears to have been
exemplary. Responsibility for the disaster
was accepted, everyone was kept fully
informed, an urgent investigation was
undertaken, and measures to prevent a
recurrence immediately instituted.1 How-
ever, matters were made extraordinarily
difficult for all involved, including her
family, by an incendiary media frenzy.
In the short time since her tragic death
there has been much comment on the
events leading to it and on what is needed
to prevent this happening again.1–3 But
there are also crucial lessons to be learned
from the way in which it has been
reported and written about. These have
wide implications. It would compound
the tragedy if the “legacy” of this so pub-
lic and so unnecessary death resulted in
improvements in ensuring organ compat-
ibility but also perpetuated attitudes that
hinder significant advances in making
health care safer. Five statements that
appeared in just one paper illustrate how
far we have to go to advance the under-
standing of safety within health care.
(1) “In the aftermath of such a disaster
there must be an assignment of blame”.
Errors, by definition, are unintentional
and are rarely truly blameworthy.4 Un-
fortunately, the tort system requires
fault to be found and blame to be appor-
tioned for compensation to be awarded,
reinforcing the powerful human ten-
dency to apportion blame on the basis of
outcome rather than culpability.5 6 The
assumption by the surgeon that incom-
patible organs would not have been
offered was, in our view, reasonable,
albeit disastrous in hindsight. Blaming—
and thereby effectively punishing—well
intentioned individuals, whether team
leaders or team members, when things
go wrong as a result of genuine errors
achieves nothing (as acknowledged by
Campion2), is unjust, and is usually
counterproductive.7 Blaming and pun-
ishing is both reasonable and appropri-
ate when a patient is harmed as a result
of a violation or deliberately unsafe act,
but this does not appear to have been the
case here.
(2) “ . . . last month the country heard that
things at Duke had gone terribly wrong for no
good reason”. There are, in fact, excellent
reasons why things go wrong with the
present approach to trying to ensure
ABO compatibility, whether for blood or
for donor organs.8 9 It is currently inevi-
table that hundreds of ABO incompat-
ibilities slip through the net every year, a
substantial number of which result in
death. Common errors such as misiden-
tification and mislabelling at ward level,
both at the time of taking blood samples
and of giving blood (or tissue) can only
be truly minimised by the establishment
of a completely separate duplicate proc-
ess, rather than trying to strengthen
intrinsically vulnerable links in a single
linear chain.
(3) “I am ultimately responsible for the
team and for this error”. We suggest that
this traditional notion is anachronistic
and illogical. While someone must be
ultimately responsible for the overall
structure and function of any team, this
person cannot in reason or justice be
responsible for every error made by any
member of the team. Transplant sur-
geons have numerous important tasks to
undertake under severe time constraints
and it is inappropriate for them to have
to divert their finite cognitive resource to
ensuring that they personally check
every aspect of every process. They
should be entitled to rely on other
trained professionals to do their jobs
properly. Is it reasonable to hold the sur-
geon responsible if faulty filters or mem-
branes were used in the cardiopulmon-
ary bypass machine, or if a wrong drug
was inadvertently used by the anesthesi-
ologist? The problem in this case appears
to have been a system failure and it is far
from clear that any individual on the
transplant team was “to blame”.4 7 The
processes used were simply inadequate
and, unfortunately, this only became
apparent by way of a disaster.
(4) “Her story does not support the cause of
strict limits on the damages a jury can
award”. Whilst fully acknowledging the
exceptional circumstances of this case
and the inability of anyone bar her
parents to fully appreciate the depth of
the resulting grief and devastation, the
general thrust of an argument to cap
punitive damages should not logically be
constrained by the story surrounding her
death, however tragic and poignant. If
anything, cases such as these provide a
strong argument for capping punitive
damages—which should only be
awarded where genuinely culpable be-
haviour has occurred. Compensation for
loss of earnings is a quite different mat-
ter, but probably does not apply to any
significant extent in this case.
(5) “Nationally, this tragedy has already
weakened the prospects in Congress for
malpractice-liability reform”. While this
may be the case, it is at least partially
because sensationalist media reports
promote the unfettered advancement of
popular misconceptions about the rela-
tionship between error and blame, espe-
cially when things that go wrong result
in unexpected catastrophic outcomes.
Accepting these misconceptions as the
basis for what should ensue in the after-
math of a disaster such as this will sim-
ply result in “more of the same”. While
some may consider that editors in the
populist press have a duty to reinforce
the prejudices of their readers, we would
argue that the opposite should pertain
with respect to the mainstream medical
press, which should promote a proper
understanding of the complex relation-
ships between error, blame, and viola-
tions when complex systems fail.
Major initiatives are underway to
address the root causes of iatrogenic
harm. One important aim is to replace
the pervasive “blame culture” in health
care with a “just culture”.7 It behoves a
journal with a richly deserved reputation
for being at the forefront of disseminat-
ing research to act as a platform for
advancing the complex arguments that
must underpin initiatives in the area of
patient safety. The statements we have
commented upon reflect widely held
sentiments. However, we believe that
they are not in accordance with current
thinking about organisational failure.4 6 7
Unchallenged, when presented in a lead-
ing medical journal, they will perpetuate
one of the root causes of iatrogenic
harm—the blaming of individuals for
the tragic consequences of system
failures.
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In 1810 a British merchant who sup-plied food to the Royal Navy discov-ered how to preserve food safely in tin
cans. The military advantages of a
portable long lasting food source pack-
aged in containers that do not break were
obvious and the popularity of canned
foods dramatically increased during the
American Civil War. The benefits for the
general population were also readily
apparent and this led to further growth in
the canned food industry. Yet the drive to
produce and package canned food safely
was not matched by an equivalent focus
on safe extraction of the contents of the
can. Soldiers used pocket knives, bayo-
nets, or even rifle fire to break into cans.A
can of veal taken on an Arctic expedition
by the British explorer Sir William Parry
carried the instruction “Cut round on the
top with a chisel and hammer”. It wasn’t
until nearly 50 years after the invention
of tin canisters that the first patent for a
can opener was issued.1
This technology lag has some remark-
able similarities to the current situation
with research transfer and uptake in
health care. We are able to produce
research—reams and reams of it. The
average practising clinician is flooded
with information; in 1992 it was esti-
mated that to keep up to date the
dedicated general physician would need
to read about 17 articles a day, every day
of the year.2 In response to this infor-
mation overload we have become more
adept at reporting and packaging re-
search. There is now a significant indus-
try devoted to improving the production
of evidence based guidance and deliver-
ing this information in ways that are
more readily accessible to clinicians.
Examples are the evolution of the Co-
chrane Library,3 the development of
abstracting journals such as Evidence
Based Medicine,4 and the production of
concise sources of reliable information
like Clinical Evidence,5 a publication that
aims to find, critically appraise, and
summarise evidence about common or
important clinical conditions seen in
primary and hospital care. Information
technology and knowledge management
systems are being used to improve timely
access to the best available knowledge.6
But efficient knowledge packaging and
delivery systems, although a critical
component of the path to knowledge
uptake, are not enough. We still lack the
can openers that will help us easily and
quickly to get research findings used to
benefit patients.
We are not the only industry where
this is an issue. The “knowing-doing
gap” has been identified as a core
problem for many companies from a
number of industries.7 So why does it
happen and what can we do about it? As
with all complex issues there are no easy
answers; knowledge remains unused in
practice for a whole host of reasons but
there are some recurrent themes that
emerge from all that has been written on
this topic. The messages from other
industries that seek to apply knowledge
in practice include:
• involve the end user from the start of
the research process;
• diagnose the reasons for failure to
adopt best practice;
• match interventions to barriers;
• focus on action;
• be prepared to learn from mistakes
rather than punish them;
• work cooperatively; and
• measure what matters.
A core theme that underpins all these
messages is the importance of a culture
that is committed to improving perform-
ance and that values action as well as
understanding. Health care has a mixed
record in this respect. It is not short on
knowledge and it is not lacking in action;
the challenge for those trying to improve
performance is to increase the linkages
between the two.
There are some astonishing examples
of slowness to implement knowledge
even when the benefits for patients and
the healthcare system are clear. Hand-
washing is a simple, virtually risk free
action that helps prevent hospital ac-
quired infection—a condition that car-
ries substantial mortality, morbidity and
cost.8 The benefits of handwashing have
been repeatedly demonstrated over the
past 150 years.9 Yet healthcare workers in
general do not wash their hands; a
review of 11 studies published in 2000
noted that the level of compliance with
basic handwashing ranged from 16% to
81%.10 The barriers to uptake have been
clearly described11 but, in most cases, the
system appears paralysed in terms of its
ability to take effective action. A compel-
ling external threat can bring sudden
change; it took little more than 2 weeks
after the first patient with a case of
severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) was admitted to Mount Sinai
Hospital in Toronto for frequent hand-
washing to become an institutional
requirement,12 but it is unlikely that
these measures will spread to areas
where SARS is unknown.
In contrast, there are several other
areas in health care that have been char-
acterised by rapid diffusion of innova-
tion; countless new technologies have
been embraced with a passionate zeal
resulting in widespread uptake. The
problem is that rapid uptake is not neces-
sarily linked to good evidence. There are
many instances where unwarranted
enthusiastic adoption of unproven
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technology—“fashions” in operations
and drug use—or behaviours such as
bottle feeding instead of breast feeding
has led to harm.13 Twenty years ago
McKinley mapped the career of a medical
innovation14 and advocated for policy
makers to use evidence of effectiveness in
decisions about allocation of healthcare
resources. We still have a lot to learn
about how to harness individual and
organisational enthusiasm for adopting
innovation and to direct this energy into
areas where there is sound evidence of
value to be gained from increased uptake.
Making better connections between
knowledge generation, knowledge deliv-
ery, and practical action is the challenge
that now faces the healthcare industry if
it wants to improve performance and
deliver better care. Our efforts this
century should focus on designing the
can and the can opener in parallel.
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